Winter is coming. This time, however, it is not just the motto of House Stark, made famous thanks to the immense popularity gained by the Game of Thrones series. In fact, the month of September is now coming to an end and the hot summer days remain just a memory, in Italy as much as in the rest of Europe.
Fall has now begun, especially in Eastern Europe, where temperatures are already quite low and the days are getting rainy. And that, for all the men and women deployed on both sides of the Eastern Front, is a huge problem.
Since time immemorial, military history has counted the fearsome Eastern European winter as one of the worst catastrophes for any army to face. And this time, too, there will be no particular exception.
In recent weeks, the Kharkiv front line has been completely broken through by Ukrainian troops, who have managed to position themselves along the new line positioned on the Oskil River, forcing the Russians to abandon countless population centers and positions they have controlled since the first months of the war.
On the southern front at Kherson, however, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was far more modest in its results, aided by the greater resistance offered by the Russian defenders, who were well aware of the impossibility of easily retreating beyond the waters of the Dnieper.
In fact, for some time now, Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS systems have repeatedly hit the Antonovskiy Bridge, - positioned to the east of the built-up area - seriously limiting the transitability of the artifact and the transportation of men, trucks and supplies from one bank to the other.
An apparent stalemate, moreover, characterizes the entire Donbass sector, where violent clashes and artillery shelling are continually taking place, without, however, any major tactical successes.
War scenarios
Net of these events, it is possible to speculate on some scenarios about the military situation in the coming months. Assuming that both sides have suffered heavy losses of men and materiel, it is difficult to imagine that the commands--Ukrainian as much as Russian--would want to launch major new offensive actions in any sector of the front.
Most likely, Ukrainian offensive action will continue slowly in both Kharkiv district and the southern front of Kherson. In the north, the most plausible objective would correspond to an attempt to move the Russian lines even further back to the administrative border of Lugansk district.
In the south, on the other hand, Ukrainian military action would aim to wear down the massive Russian forces (numerous reports estimate between 15 and 23,000 men) partially pinned down north of the Dniepr River and the consequent reduction of territory in the hands of Moscow's men.
From the Russian perspective, on the other hand, it appears to be of primary importance to exert continuous pressure, possibly followed by territorial advances, in the Donbass territories, with the ultimate goal of pushing the Ukrainian lines away from the Donetsk settlement and the conquest of the entire territory of the administrative district of the same name. The steady influx of new units, vehicles and supplies-including numerous units hastily withdrawn from the Kharkiv front-seems to confirm this intention and the centrality of this front to the Kherson, Nikopol and Zaporizhzia area.
Russian or Ukrainian October?
Of course, much of what happens in the coming months will be influenced by the weather conditions in the area. The months of October and November, in particular, are likely to impose a temporary offensive pause.
In fact, this period is characterized by constant rains and low temperatures, capable of dropping rapidly below zero at night. On the one hand, the rains are bound to turn the green Ukrainian countryside into immense expanses of mud, difficult to cross by the heavy armored and armored vehicles currently in use.
This problem, as already seen in late February and during last March, is also bound to plague the immense supply chain, which is likely to be seriously slowed down in the timing and amount of ammunition and resources available on the front lines.
The bitter cold, moreover, is bound to affect the efficiency of men and vehicles who, for obvious reasons, can no longer be safe in simple trenches and open-air emplacements, but need warm shelters well protected from the weather. Consequently, it is logical to think of a gradual reduction in war operations, at least for these two months.
Such a condition, moreover, would play to the advantage of both sides, which could then have time to lick their wounds and build up new units for use in future operations.
The Winter General
In the time interval from December to the end of February, on the other hand, we could see a new explosion of fighting and offensive actions-perhaps even of medium importance-given the ability of heavy vehicles to operate again in the open field. The cold temperatures of these months, in fact, are bound to make the ground solid and compact again, thus allowing greater range of action of the armored units.
Not surprisingly, in the past, the Soviet armed forces often took advantage of this particular interval to launch major new actions, involving tens of thousands of men and vehicles. Today, although there is not the same availability of men and the technologies have changed radically, the conformation of the battlefield obliges Ukrainians and Russians to carefully evaluate these conditions, on pain of the possible failure of any military action and the accumulation of even greater losses. Everything, therefore, is in the hands of General Winter.
Mud wrestling
"Both sides now struggle in the autumn mud. On October 6 [1941] the first snow had fallen, unusually early. It soon melted, transforming the entire landscape into its usual roadless state-the rasputitsa, literally the "roadless weather.".... It is a commonplace to attribute the Germans' failure to conquer Moscow to the sudden change in the weather."
Yet, come to think of it, modern technologies have radically changed since the last major conflict on eastern soil. How is it possible, then, that cold, frost and snow can still hinder fighting so much?
For one thing, there is currently no innovative system capable of solving the problems caused by muddy and marshy terrain. And already this fact radically reduces the ability of armored vehicles and vehicles tasked with resupplying troops at the front.
In particular, the first two months of the war left important evidence of this historical problem. Countless, in fact, were the vehicles abandoned - by both sides in the war - during offensive or rapid retreat phases, as they became completely stuck in the mud and unable to move.
Aware of such problems, Russians and Ukrainians were forced to fight along the main communication routes, which generally had solid asphalt cover, and in population centers. Obviously, this had serious consequences for the outcomes of the fighting, largely to the advantage of the defenders, who were able to take advantage of the concentration of fire on the hottest points of the front.
Second, harsh temperatures, bad weather and snow constitute the most fearsome adversary of mobile warfare. Indeed, special equipment and heavy winter clothing are not enough to win a war. In order for an army to be able to fight in this season, there is a primary need to establish a long series of shelters, underground positions, bunkers and outposts perfectly heated and equipped with what is necessary for daily life.
Failure to do so runs the risk of exposing huge numbers of men to heavy suffering in the open air, with all the possible consequences imaginable. Trench foot, frostbite, flu, dysentery, tissue injury and hypothermia are just some of the major hardships caused by the lack of adequate shelter.
They are, come to think of it, the same annoyances that claimed thousands and thousands of lives during the Napoleonic campaign in Russia, the Axis invasion (and subsequent rout) of the Soviet Union, and the high mountain warfare experienced by Italians and Austrians during the Great War.
Jammed weapons and first aid
Suffering from the cold, however, are not only men, but also vehicles and weapons, whether light or heavy. On the one hand, there is the risk of seeing a gradual reduction in available transport and armored vehicles due to increased mechanical issues. On the other hand, there is the risk of having to employ individual and team weapons potentially exposed to repeated jamming and malfunction.
Of course, artillery and explosives are also exposed to possible alterations in their functions. A fact that, in the long run, is likely to prove quite dangerous for operators and those who expect adequate support from heavy weapons. The only solutions? An adequate system of warm shelters and massive logistics behind them, capable of providing any necessary repair work quickly.
Last but not least, of course, aspects that have to do with providing a chance of survival for front- and second-line combatants should be listed. Providing medical care and first aid, in general, is one of the most complex activities to perform on the battlefield. Under optimal conditions, a health worker must act under extreme conditions, often under enemy fire or at the risk of becoming an easy target. In a great many cases, the tools available are completely disproportionate to the severity of battlefield wounds and injuries that, thus, require immediate extraction of the wounded.
It will not be difficult, at this point, to understand what the difficulties of providing emergency medical care in prohibitive temperatures, in the constant rain and in the frost of Ukraine may be. Given the impossibility of providing relief at makeshift stations, again it is necessary to equip the rear with an efficient system of shelters-hospitals in the heat and a rapid evacuation line for the wounded.
They have made mistakes and I believe they will draw the necessary conclusions. If they do not change the strategy of conducting the special military operation in the next day or two, I will be forced to contact the top leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the country's leadership to explain the real situation on the ground.
At present, however, such a structure exists only along the Donbass front, now stable since 2015. The entire rest of the line, however, to the north as much as to the south, is completely devoid of passive defenses and structures of any significance.
Here, aided by the many rapid changes in the front line, there are nothing but trench sections and individual underground emplacements (called Foxholes). Posts that, while they may prove useful in warm weather, are by no means suitable for the winter period.
Then, net of this particular scenario, it is easy to imagine what might happen militarily, at least until next spring.
The very recent partial mobilization of reservists in Russia, moreover, seems to confirm these assumptions. It is impossible, no matter how much personnel with previous military experience are involved, to reinvigorate units at the front too quickly. Even longer, however, is the process of forming new units, which are unlikely to be ready for their baptism of fire before the end of the year.
The entire planet, meanwhile, remains with bated breath.
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