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The Russian defensive line on the Zaporizhzhia front.
For months on the southern front, the Ukrainians have been trying to advance against the Russian defensive line for control of the entire strip of land from the territories south of Kherson to the borders of the Donetsk Oblast.
The focus of the action is concentrated on a front of a few hundred kilometers located in the Zhaporizhzhia area, where Ukrainian commands have decided -- in agreement with NATO military advisers -- to concentrate the offensive action of the much-announced Ukrainian counteroffensive.
The offensive, however, has not yet lived up to expectations and, unlike what the general public expected, has been only able to bring about reduced spatial changes, particularly in the Robotyne city area. The reasons for such a situation on the ground are as numerous as they are very different.
Among the main ones, however, absolutely must be listed the countless lines of defense set up by the Russians during the preceding months, well aware of the possibility that the Ukrainian commands would order a major offensive on the southern front, with the Crimean Peninsula as the final target.
But how is the Russian defense line in the area constituted?
General concept of defense
Russian commands in charge of managing operations on the southern front opted, aware of the potential of the Ukrainian armed forces, for an elastic line of defense in depth, capable of combining fixed elements with mobile resources to be allocated where necessary.
The largest part - consequently also easiest to identify thanks to the many aerial vision systems - is, of course, the fixed obstacles, consisting mainly of a mix of trenches, artillery and mortar emplacements, underground bunkers, anti-tank ditches, "dragon's teeth," and shelters for men and vehicles. In the midst of it all, there are also hundreds of kilometers of minefields of varying depths and equipped with a very lethal mix of anti-personnel and anti-tank systems.
The main idea, in this case, was to Divide the front into three different lines of defense, always interspersed with more or less variable elements - and solid - depending on the conformation of the terrain. The advanced line consists of a mix of buried and fixed works, positioned unevenly according to soil characteristics.
The first line, on the other hand, is already more structured and compact, boasting linearity and continuity in the presence of the trenches and fixed posts protecting the front. The second line, on the other hand, echoes the characteristics of the first defense system, including within it the main settlements positioned on its course. Going into detail, however, it is possible to understand their structure and function even better.
The advanced line
The advanced line represents the first set of obstacles set up to defend the Ukrainian southern front. Its extent is highly variable and does not exactly cover the entire front from Kherson to Donetsk, but it is present almost exclusively in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where Russian commands-according to intelligence information-expected the biggest offensive bump.
In this regard, in order to reinforce the defenses of the first, effective, line of battle, this system of trenches and emplacements was prepared. So far, the presence of anti-personnel and anti-tank mines proved to be a key element of Russian defensive strategy.
In fact, these systems, of different weights and sizes, were entrusted with the important task of hindering the advance of armor and men, so as to weaken the power of the attacking forces and, thus, ease the weight exerted on the effective front line. The positions - in this case, but as also found in the next two lines of defense - Are positioned mainly at tree rows bordering cultivated fields and forests, occasionally present in some bands from the area.
The reason, in this case, is very simple. It is, in fact, the only land where it is possible to count on natural protection, in this case offered by trees, the rest consisting of open, barren, flat countryside.
The first line
The first line, as anticipated in the previous paragraph, represents the first major defensive obstacle set up by Russian engineers to halt the Ukrainian offensive impact. To this end, the front line boasts a far more robust and structured system of defense, consisting of Trenches of various lengths, underground bunkers, and anti-tank systems Of various types. In particular, they opted for a mix of anti-tank mines, concrete obstacles-the famous dragon's teeth-and anti-tank ditches dug into the ground.
All of this, of course, was interspersed with trenches and other gun emplacements, capable of offering direct protection to the established works. In many cases, the first obstacles encountered were the minefields, followed later by an anti-tank ditch of large size and some depth, which is then followed by other minefields and dragon's teeth.
Once the Dragon's teeth, which are triangular-shaped reinforced concrete pylons driven into the ground, there is always a system of trenches, defended by varying numbers of men depending on the size of the trenches and the importance attached to that section of the front. The distance between the anti-tank ditch, dragon's teeth and trenches is about 250-300 meters respectively per section, thus creating a first line that is an average of 1 to 2 kilometers deep, again depending on which sector of the front you are in.
The second line
Behind the second line, a widely varying number of kilometers away, interspersed always with a mix of minefields and trenches, lies instead the second-and at least currently the last-large Russian defense line. This occasionally follows the same characteristics as the first, but relies on a greater number of population centers Of average size inserted within it.
These, in particular, represent a Additional strength of the defensive line-up because, for natural reasons, they constitute real ramparts, intended to serve as a battlefield in case of a Ukrainian breakthrough until the latter line is reached. Around these natural obstacles, the defenses follow a very different pattern from what has been seen before.
First, there is a concentric defense system that entirely surrounds the settlements, so as to provide both an external defense and a possible second line of defense immediately available south of the settlement, should it be captured (in this case by penetration from the north, east, or west). Beyond these latter positions, however, there is almost only the open countryside.
From commonly available satellite images there are currently no traces of impressive new works by the Russian genius, at least as far as the Crimean coast, which too were heavily fortified to counter any possible amphibious assault or armed incursion from the north. As for, however, the depth of the entire defense system formed by the Russians, estimates range from an average of 15/20 km to peaks of 30km depth at the most sensitive locations and of greater interest.
The resilient defense
The second key element employed by the Russians in the defense of the Ukrainian southern front is the preparation of a resilient defense. In particular, it was decided to Divide the number of sufficient troops at the front according to the importance held by the sector and the risk of breakthrough in a given area, always leaving a certain number of units in reserve.
The largest number of troops, as easily imagined, was originally placed in the central sector of the front (Zaporizhzhia Oblast), which runs from the village of Vasylivka - once placed facing the waters of the Dnieper - to areas south of Vuhledar, almost in close proximity to the pro-Russian Donbass territories.
In this area, in fact, the Federation's military intelligence commands and officials expected the Ukrainian assault, and, as it turned out later, this is precisely what happened in the end.
As a result of increasing offensive pressure, the number of resources deployed, and the increasing number of human and material losses, the commands have opted to strengthen defenses with new troops and armaments, partly by drawing on its own reserves specially placed in the distant rear of the front and partly by taking what it could from sectors deemed of secondary importance, particularly on the northern front.
In this way, though the intensity of the fighting became increasingly greater and more devastating, the Russians could always count on a large number of units to be deployed in the area, thus replacing the most decimated departments and filling the holes left by the units that were completely destroyed and bled out.
Because of these availabilities and the possibility of repositioning a number of reserves, the advanced fighting lines fully performed a delaying and bleeding function against the Ukrainian attackers, who thus faced unexpected resistance.
The first consequence on the Ukrainian side, in this case, was the involvement in the clash of an increasing number of large, operationally proven units, often equipped with new Western-supplied MBTs and vehicles, in order to permanently break all opposing resistance.
Fact which, as an obvious consequence, further raised the intensity of the confrontation, leading to the direct involvement of more and more Russian reserves, occasionally also from non-active sectors of the same southern front. In this way, the'constant influx of resources has succeeded in transforming what was originally just an advanced line of defense, In the main line of combat, moving the clashes as far as possible away from what was, in theory, the first, major, line of defense.
Conclusions
"The offensive began about 90 days ago. It has gone more slowly than its planners anticipated. But that is the difference between what Clausewitz called war on paper and real war. And there is still a reasonable amount of time, probably between 30 and 45 days, of favorable weather conditions for fighting."
In this way, the skillful choice in the defensive field was - at least momentarily - able to prevent a breakthrough of the impressive defense system established in the area, thus allowing what was originally conceived as a major mechanized offensive to be turned into bloody trench warfare. Such tactics, however, still led to serious consequences among the Russian ranks.
By deciding to offer maximum resistance on these positions, without taking full advantage of the opportunity to fall back on secondary lines of defense, losses proved to be quite high, both in terms of men and means. Although the number of casualties on both fronts-aside from some inaccurate estimates-is still difficult to quantify reliably, it is easily guessed that the actual number is extremely high.
A first clue, at least as far as the Federation's military deployment is concerned, is given by the fact that, in the region of maximum Ukrainian penetration, more and more assault brigades, units originally conceived and trained for offensive tactical functions, have been employed, rather than defensive. And this fact, although it may go unnoticed in the eyes of many, is particularly significant. Indeed, with the decision to involve these units in an all-out defense, priority was given to holding the line at any cost.
A fact that, in the long run, will surely bring problems to the Armed Forces of the Federation, which thus risk finding themselves deprived of important resources to deploy in attack contexts.
At this point it would be logical to infer that, in the eyes of the Russian commands., it is a priority to maintain the front line so as to consolidate its territorial gains and subsequently bring about an operational stalemate on this front. Hardly, in fact, after the huge losses suffered, is it possible to envisage some new major offensive operation - in this case by both sides - on any front.
And the weak magnitude of the Russian attacks launched in the Svatove area, which in any case remained weakened by the dispatch of numerous Ukrainian units to the south, is perhaps the greatest confirmation of this. Now, however, all that remains is to await the development of events in waiting for autumn and winter.
Class of 1996, he graduated in 2020 with a degree in linguistic sciences from the Catholic University of the
Sacro Cuore in Milan, later perfecting his studies in Strategic Affairs at LUISS in Rome.
He currently works for the family business group, devoting part of his free time to the
study of major armed, social and political conflicts of the twentieth century and the present day. Over the years, he has
intended special attention also to the entire social, political and economic environment of the Middle
East, Ukraine and North Africa. In 2021, he published "Hezbollah: History, Organization
and doctrine of the Party of God."
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