Chain reaction
The visit of the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives to Taiwan was the first high-profile one in several decades, triggering Beijing's obvious indignant reactions.
In order not to "losing face," a central concept in Chinese social philosophy, especially toward its own nationalist public opinion, after repeated threats toward similar gestures, Beijing had to launch unprecedented military exercises surrounding the island with joint air and naval maneuvers.
A jumble of condemnatory statements crowded the pages of Western media, but missing from the scene was a reaction from countries on the same continent directly involved in a possible crisis in Taiwan or the waters of the South China Sea.
Indeed, reactions in Asia have been very different than in Europe, even, in some cases, surprisingly so.
Taiwan supporters
The only country on the mainland that publicly expressed strong condemnation of the Chinese retaliation to Nancy Pelosi's visit was Japan, a regional rival of the People's Republic, engaged in a rapid and massive arms race.
The Japanese leadership on several occasions has reiterated that. an attack on Taiwan would be considered an attack on Japan, and the Self-Defense Forces would intervene in the conflict alongside the island's military And, presumably, of the United States.
Growing interdependence with the Chinese economy has not allowed any other government on the continent to use heated tones of disapproval toward military exercises.
A more attenuated gradation of the color of the statements, which could be united by the generic line of "moderation of actionsi unilateral" without mentioning China, it could still be approached as limited support toward the Taiwanese cause
(The launching of missiles) ... is a serious problem for the security of our country and our people ... We call for an immediate halt to military exercises
The UAE affirms its support for China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as for the importance of respecting the "One China" principle, recalling adherence to United Nations resolutions. The UAE recalls its concern about the impact of any provocative visit on international stability
This position comes from three countries to which China has marked geopolitical competition:
- Vietnam: with which China fought a border conflict in 1979 and disputes territorial waters in the South China Sea.
- India: hegemonic power in South Asia, a member of the QUAD group, which has fought several border wars with China, the closest ally of Pakistan's archenemy.
- Singapore: financial center of Asia and base of the U.S. fleet. The U.S. Naval Command has speculated on moving the 1st Fleet headquarters to Singapore.
These are positions moderated by several caveats, so much so that the Singapore one was retracted after a meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister.
The same happened in the case of the Philippines, which initially called on the parties to contain tensions and then at the call of the Chinese Ambassador in Manila reiterated adherence to the "One China Policy"
Supporters of the People's Republic
After the Russian military intervention in Ukraine, the People's Republic was able to capitalize on its silent support and the "boundless friendship" declared to the two heads of state. Condemnation as "provocation" of Nancy Pelosi's visit circumscribes the perimeter of possible allies, albeit without formal treaties, of the People's Republic In case of military operation in Taiwan.
Primarily, this quasi-alliance would see the pivot in the strategic triangle between Beijing, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation, with their respective "client" states": Syria (a Russian-Iranian condominium, following the relocation of Russian forces to Ukraine), Yemen, the Burmese military junta strongly supported by Beijing, and North Korea.
In this fairly defined scenario One surprise emerges: the United Arab Emirates. Historic partner and key oil supply country for Western countries, have expressed, in an unprecedented way, direct disapproval of the U.S. speaker's visit.
The following should be added to this lineup of allies Governments that have declared a "support for China's territorial integrity" that can be divided into two macrogroups:
- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, under Russian-Chinese influence and embraced by the so-called Belt and Road Initiative projects, including Taliban Afghanistan, with which Beijing intends to sign lucrative mining contracts
- Laos, Cambodia in Southeast Asia, with which China has had relations since the Cold War.
In this field, a negative (but not too negative) surprise for the defenders of the Taiwanese cause even comes from within NATO: Erdogan's Turkey, which signals that it takes greater account of the huge Chinese market, defense of ethnic Turkic Uyghur or solidarity with Western allies.
Neutrals
The rest of the Asian countries have chosen a position of absolute neutrality, with one group, the states of the Arabian Peninsula, including those hosting U.S. bases, preferring silence, while a second Southeast Asian group opted to demonstrate a generic "concern about rising tensions in the Strait," including Indonesia and Malaysia, coastal states of the South China Sea.
South Korea, which also hosts bases and missile systems to defend itself against its northern neighbor, but has deep economic relations with the People's Republic chose a generic formula, expressing the need for dialogue and cooperation.
Neutrality could be seen as a point in China's favor, even in relation to U.S. attempts to assemble as broad a coalition as possible that could counter China's military rise.
What does it imply for a conflict scenario?
This scenario shows that the weight of China's economic relations heavily influences the international positioning of the respective governments, for which the People's Republic is a market for its raw materials or processed products or a financier of infrastructure projects.
Analyzing these statements, it would seem that Taiwan's defense would find only in Japan the only Asian country ready to intervene directly or support the island.
Other countries tending for geopolitical reasons to maintain a supportive position would face several critical issues in dealing with the consequences of a hard line.
India and Vietnam have been the recipients of substantial Chinese foreign direct investment over the past decade while Singapore, following events in Hong Kong, is becoming the destination for capital outflows from the People's Republic and is historically trying to maintain a balance between the two superpowers.
Russian Federation and Iran, already hit by massive Western sanctions, with open disputes and thus unlikely to shift in the medium term to a less-aligned stance, could provide a fair amount of military support while the Gulf oil countries could maintain the flow of oil.
An instrument of the eventual U.S. military device i.e. thehe closure of "chokepoints" to transport ships to China, which would be conceivable in the event of open conflict between the United States and the People's Republic, would seem to find some difficulty in the lack of cooperation from local governments, both in the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia.
In a hypothetical and undesirable war scenario, the joint forces of Japan, the United States and possible European naval expeditions still maintain technological supremacy over China and possible allies, but the nineteenth century is over: in calculating the clash it will be necessary to take into account what Asia thinks.
Like many other countries, India is concerned about recent developments. We admonish the exercise of restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions that could change the status quo, de-escalation of tensions, and efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region
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