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Taiwan's first crisis as a civil war
The first Taiwan crisis could be considered the final act of the Chinese civil war that officially ended in 1949 with Mao Zedong's conquest of South China.
Chinese Communists triumphed on the mainland, while the Nationalist party, the Koumintang, led by Chiang Kai Shek, was forced to retreat to the island of Taiwan.
Nevertheless, both the People's Republic of China, which the Republic of China, ROC, which claimed to be China's only legitimate leaders.
Although the People's Republic was immensely more powerful and populous, the ROC had maintained international diplomatic primacy, as it remained the most globally recognized China, holding China's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, with its key veto right.
The People's Republic at that time was recognized as the legitimate China only by the communist bloc countries of the world, and thus two political factions, embodied in two countries, claiming sovereignty over the same territory were pitted against each other across the Taiwan Strait.
The establishment of the People's Republic of China on the mainland was not necessarily seen as a complete victory for Mao and the Communists, as the KMT had succeeded in making the strategic retreat to Taiwan.
Moreover, much of the territory, from the western provinces, to Tibet, Sichuan, to Hainan Island was taken only in the residual phase of the war in 1950, which was in fact still ongoing.
Mao wanted to defeat Chiang Kai Shek once and for all since significant pockets of pro-nationalist guerrillas still remained and Chiang Kai Shek still dreamed of being able to return to the mainland-a feat that with U.S. help, he thought feasible.
Chiang had not reckoned with Harry Truman's U.S. Administration, which was reluctant to involve the United States, in part because it was widely seen as a lost cause.
While Truman remained an anti-communist, the corruption and misrule of the KMT, one of the reasons the communists were able to gain widespread popular support especially on the mainland, made defending the Nationalist Party's authoritarian regime an unappealing mission, going so far as to state in January 1950 that the United States would refrain from intervening in the event of further conflict between Beijing and Taipei.
The Cold War in Asia
These were the years when the Iron Curtain descended on Eastern Europe and all the administration's attentions were turned to the theater of confrontation with the Soviet Union, so U.S. policy in Asia was a lower priority in the eyes of Washington decision makers.
The scenario changed abruptly with the outbreak of the Korean War.. Suddenly, the scenario changed and the strategic importance of Taiwan as a shield for U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines became clear.
If the island had been taken by the Communists, it would have left exposed those forward bases in the Pacific, from which he could control the movements of the Soviet fleet moored in Vladivostok.
In June 1950, Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which had recently moved from Qingdao, China, to Subic Bay in the Philippines, to cross into the Taiwan Strait to ward off any attempts by the People's Republic to attack Taiwan, declaring a "neutralization" of the Strait, which was later sealed by the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan (the island's previous colonial ruler)
The attack on Korea makes it clear beyond any doubt that communism has gone beyond using subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the United Nations Security Council issued to preserve international peace and security. Under these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would pose a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to U.S. forces carrying out their legitimate and necessary functions there. Accordingly, I ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action, I call on the Chinese government of Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will see to it that this happens. Determination of Formosa's future status must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace agreement with Japan or consideration by the United Nations.
As a result of this and public pressure, the United States, even under the leadership of a reluctant Harry Truman, began to increase its support for Chiang Kai Shek. Loans and grants were provided, and assistance in reorganizing the military and implementing government reforms was guaranteed.
The ascent to the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower "Ike" in 1953 saw a marked increase in American support for the Republic of China. Ike reversed Truman's neutral stance toward Taiwan and initiated a change of course called the "Chiang Kai Shek unleashing."
Indeed, recently declassified documents confirm that the Eisenhower administration actively provided large amounts of both military aid, amounting to $940 million, and financial aid around $527 million, so as to strengthen its armed forces and support its economy.
The unleashing of Chiang
Chiang, defeated on land, maintained a fleet superior to that of Communist China and maintained the so-called "guanbi" policy (閉港政策), a permenent aeronaval blockade on the entire mainland coast to block traffic bound for the People's Republic, even going so far as to assault foreign vessels in international waters.
Part of the U.S. military support was for strengthening the first line of defense on Nationalist-controlled islands, including the Penghu Islands, in the center of the Taiwan Strait, and the Kinman and Matsu Islands, which lie just off the southeastern coast of the mainland near the city of Xiamen.
Chiang Kai Shek, not only wanted to protect himself, but was looking for his chance to reverse the outcomes of the civil war with a spectacular invasion of the mainland. To have any hope, had to convince the United States that through a combination of further training of KMT forces and, most importantly, a massive deployment of U.S. troops, this operation could have been successful.
He was also convinced that Communist China's main ally, Soviet Union, would have abstained From involvement in the first Taiwan crisis.
The reason he thought this position of the Soviets was plausible was the temporary power vacuum in Moscow, since a charismatic and centralizing figure like Stalin had just died and no leader had yet emerged who could take the reins of the Communist bloc. Thus, by August 1954, the Nationalists had deployed some 73,000 men to the islands of Matsu and Kinmen, on the alert for an assault from the coast in the hands of the Communist Party of China, which was organizing an eastern tactical command.
At the same time, the geopolitical chessboard is evolving because at those very junctures the details of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) were being planned., a mutual defense agreement similar to the Euro-Atlantic NATO formed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and Australia. SEATO's mission was to counter the further expansion of communism in the region and, of course, the People's Republic of China was on high alert.
Beijing attacks first
Anticipating Western moves, five days before the signing of the treaty, the People's Liberation Army began to bombard heavily Matsu and Kinmen, marking the beginning of what went down in history as the first Taiwan Strait crisis.
The goal was Bringing Taiwan under Beijing's control, before SEATO could be activated, and especially to give a response to the idea of an additional military outfit, the proposed Northeast Asian Treaty Organization or NEATO, an alliance with similar functions that would have potentially consisted of the United States, Japan, South Korea and the Republic of China in Taiwan.
Absorbed in diplomatic entanglements, Americans were relatively taken by surprise from attacking the Matsu and Kinmen islands, but still refrained from intervening, since the commitment to protect Taiwan was confined to the island of Taiwan itself and the Penghu or Pescadores islands, but not the islands beyond the Chinese coast, because they feared the possibility of triggering a war both People's Republic and with the Soviet Union over territories of little strategic importance and almost indefensible.
A few months later, in November 1954, the People's Republic also began bombing Dachen Island, north of Taiwan, just off the city of Taizhou. This deeper attack had the effect of strengthening work on a new mutual defense agreement between the U.S. and Taiwan.
The question of the scope of this agreement remained open. Chiang Kai Shek wanted U.S. protection over all Taiwanese territory, including the offshore islands, while the United States wanted to limit the military umbrella only to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.
Chiang Kai Shek, fearing that the loss of the islands would not only damage the morale of the National Revolutionary Army, but that thus his dreams of recapturing the mainland apart from the coastal islands would be dashed, remained firm in his wishes. Eventually a compromise was found, and on December 1, 1954, Washington and Taipei signed a joint declaration on the mutual defense treaty.
The beginning of American strategic ambiguity.
The Americans reaffirmed their commitment to protect Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, but allowed themselves flexibility on the coastal islands: military intervention could be applied based on mutual agreement between the two sides. In this way Chiang Kai Shek obtained a relative degree of protection, while leaving the United States' hands free not to participate in a conflict if they deemed the situation unfavorable. These were the prodromes of the policy of strategic ambiguity that characterized American engagement in the region.
The People's Republic reacted to the treaty by intensifying the bombardment of offshore islands. In early 1955, an assault was launched against the Yijiang Islands, just north of the Taizhou Islands, and bombardment of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands continued.
The U.S. response was the Formosa Resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate and signed into law on January 29, 1955. The Resolution authorized the President of the United States "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack," by implication, by Communists.
The new Eisenhower administration also threatened the use of nuclear weapons against the People's Republic if their attacks escalated further. The idea had been advocated, as early as September 1954, by the Office of the President from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Fear of Soviet retaliation was growing in Europe, and European NATO partners, through Churchill's mouth, warned of the consequences of using an atomic warhead.
With Yijiang Island now under PRC control, Beijing turned its attention to Dachen Island, but while Taipei wanted to save the island, the U.S. remained skeptical of its strategic importance and strongly advised Chiang Kai Shek to evacuate it and concentrate defenses on other areas.
Crisis eases
It was a difficult choice for Chiang to make, which moreover contradicted the Americans' earlier advice to fortify and garrison the island. In the end he made up his mind: although he feared the impact that giving up the islands would have on the morale of the armed forces, he feared even more the loss of American support, and the island was evacuated.
Not long after, PRC Premier Zhou Enlai issued a détente statement in which he said that the PRC would be willing to bring Taiwan back under Beijing's control by peaceful means and not only by military conquest.
In mid-April 1955, at the Bandung Conference, the first conference of the forum of "neutral," predominantly African and Asian nations, Zhou proposed a cease-fire. At further talks between the two Chinas, the United States insisted on the People's Republic's promise to stop using force against Taiwan, which Beijing was not willing to do, however.
This reluctance stemmed from the fact that the communists viewed the situation with Taiwan as a continuation of the civil war, i.e., an internal issue, not recognizing Taiwan as an independent nation, and saw this situation as interference by a foreign power.
During these same talks, the United States declared its willingness to officially recognize both Chinas, a recognition that neither Chinas wanted, however, as it would legitimize the existence of the other. Thus, although a cease-fire was established and the impending crisis de-escalated, the underlying reasons for the crisis remained on the table.
One of the consequences of the first Taiwan crisis was that in response to American threats about the use of nuclear weapons, the People's Republic in turn began its own atomic research and development program.
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