VBIED dossier: the future of land warfare?

The ultimate weapon or one of desperation?

What are VBIEDs

Over the past fifteen years, there have been countless new-technology weaponry revealed to the eyes of the world during trade shows, regular irregular conflicts or more or less unintentional leaks.

Often, these are million-dollar, if not billion-dollar, products from years of research and testing by major companies in the industry. In other cases, however, these are Semi-craft experiments, often done directly on the battlefield or in the immediate rear, always following all the lessons learned from real situations. Among the most interesting and devastating systems, however, one out of all emerges for a wide variety of reasons: the VBIEDs.

By this term - an acronym for Vehicle-born Improvised Explosive Device - means any vehicle, whether commercially or militarily produced, that has been converted into a lethal weapon system through the addition of a remote guidance system and the presence of numerous pounds, if not tons, of explosives.

Alternatively, as often seen in recent Middle Eastern conflicts, the vehicle can also be driven by a suicide volunteer, whose goal is to personally maneuver the vehicle to its destination, where the final detonation system is activated, resulting in the direct death of the driver. This, however, is named SVBIED, where the "S" stands for "Suicide."

For obvious reasons, it is not possible to speak of SVBIEDs as decisive systems for the course of a battle, as their very particular and delicate design is not applicable and reiterable in every context, but only in the context of terrorism with religious connotations, as seen repeatedly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

As a result, there remains only the possibility of assessing the capabilities of remote-guided models, the future of which could be absolutely prosperous, if not paramount, for the conflicts of the coming years and decades to come.

As anticipated in the previous lines, the main advantage of using a VBIED is the fact that it is an unmanned vehicle, thus safely deployable without the risk of human casualties in the event of an anti-tank mine impact or if the vehicle is hit by artillery systems, ATGMs, or hand-held anti-tank weapons. Second, remote piloting allows-thanks to a vision system and cameras placed on the vehicle-the operator to move the vehicle with ease and precision, thus avoiding any obstacles on the ground, until the target to be hit is reached.

Last, but not least of course, is the enormous explosive load such a system can carry within it. The greater the amount of explosives present, the greater the blast radius and, consequently, the degree of devastation exerted on a given target.

Based on what has been analyzed in previous years, the damage from a VBIED is always related to the size of the vehicle employed and the proximity of the explosion to the target. Since any vehicle can be repurposed in such a manner, there has been theuse of a varied array of extremely different vehicles, from utility cars, to trucks, to converted armored vehicles, and even larger vehicles repurposed for war requirements. In each of these cases, the operatives-usually Islamist militias of Salafist or Wahhabi orientation-have succeeded in inflicting heavy losses in men and vehicles on the other side.

In many cases, the use of VBIED has been able to disintegrate entire large structures, such as residential buildings, hospitals, barracks and entire concrete buildings. The effect of the detonation, in fact, is not only devastating to the structures, but especially to the occupants and all those affected by its range.

Employment tactics

But in detail, how can such a system be used?

From what we have witnessed so far, at least in Middle Eastern conflicts, the VBIED were mainly employed as an offensive and defensive tool. In the case of offensive deployment, the armed vehicle is rapidly driven in the direction of the target to be hit, generally always accompanied by the visual support of a drone, which allows monitoring of the situation in the field and helps in the guidance of the vehicle.

Once the predetermined target is reached, the explosive ignition system is remotely activated, which in turn activates a detonator and, thus, the desired devastating explosive effect is achieved. In such cases, theuse of a VBIED may represent an isolated event or may be employed as a preparation for an assault.

Following the explosion, in fact, the death of almost all humans in the area can generally be found, and if there are survivors, there is often a psychological, as well as physical, shock so devastating that a prompt and effective armed response is not possible.

In the case of preparatory employment for an assault, the explosion is always followed by an advance of armored vehicles and armed men, who arrive on the target within a few minutes, generally just enough to avoid the risk of being involved in friendly fire incidents. It is, therefore, a matter of a few minutes.

Defensive employment, on the other hand, follows the same technical characteristics as the offensive mode, while what changes is the context. In this case, in fact, the VBIED is being guided against an armed force-mobile or sedentary-that is on the offensive, and, as is easy to guess, its objective is to inflict losses and slow down territorial conquests.

In this way, the use of a single vehicle when conducted successfully, Has the same tactical value as a counterattack launched with men and armored means, without, in this case, human casualties on the side of the defenders. In particular, this tactic in a defensive context can prove critically important for a group of defenders who are in serious difficulty due to numerical or means inferiority.

A very good example here is the battle of Mosul, where Islamic State militiamen-now completely surrounded and unable to receive supplies or reinforcements-inflicted heavy losses on regular armed forces and Afghan militias engaged in the very violent urban clashes.

The use of a VBIED from a defensive perspective, even if the vehicle is destroyed at a safe distance from the other side, still proves to be effective, as its mere use acts intensely on human psychology, creating fear and uncertainty and, usually, even slowing down or halting offensive operations for a time. Again, the Battle of Mosul turns out to be an excellent case study in this regard.

Vulnerability and costs

VBIED, being easily obtained by modification of any available vehicle, has a relatively low cost. Compared with almost all contemporary weapon systems and vehicles on a battlefield, which employ an ever-increasing number of state-of-the-art technologies, a vehicle in the terminal phase of its existence may also be available as a starting point, taking into account that these are single-use systems. In fact, in numerous cases, converted military vehicles have also been employed since they are practically unusable otherwise.

To this, of course, must be added the cost resulting from the installation of the remote guidance system and cameras, which, however, are never excessive, given that commercial and freely available systems have almost always been used on the market, often even at low cost. Last, there is the cost of the guards to protect the vehicle and the explosive to be used. Since this is a semi-artificial system, at least from what we have seen to date, any available explosive system was often employed, from old, now unusable artillery shells to anti-tank mines. In short, any explosive-laden tool or wreck can easily be reused in such a way.

Although we are always talking about a system without a human driver and with remote guidance, it is always good to consider equipping the VBIED with an additional armor and protection system, so as to protect it from the fire of the automatic and anti-tank weapons available on a battlefield. The protection, of course, can be more or less heavy depending on the type of vehicle and the desired effect.

As the amount of armor present increases there will be a gradual reduction in speed, a fact that could instead be of great interest in many contexts. However, although there is an inevitable reduction in speed, it is always highly advisable to adopt armor, at least capable of blocking shots from assault rifles, light machine guns, and, ideally, heavier machine guns.

VBIED in regular contexts

Currently, the use of these means has almost always been the sole and exclusive domain of irregular armed groups. In fact, very few state organized entities have resorted to weapons of this type. A recent case, however, is the conflict in Ukraine, where some VBIED specimens have been deployed by the Russian Armed Forces for offensive purposes.

Based on videos available on the Web, no more than four incidents can be counted in which remotely guided vehicles were driven close to Ukrainian trenches, where they were consequently detonated. In at least one case the defenders were able to destroy the vehicle at some distance, while still being caught up in the violent shock wave generated by the explosion.

In other cases, however, the vehicle employed was always able to arrive at or near its destination, achieving full operational success. The effects, as can be imagined, were particularly devastating for the defenders, who died as a result of the explosion or, in the best cases, found themselves unable to hold position and, therefore, retreat. These cases, though isolated, represent a first experiment with such use by a state armed force and, most likely, could represent a turning point in land warfare.

Benefits of using

Once the operation and employment tactics of these particular weapon systems are understood, it comes very naturally to ask the most important question. Is it worth investing in and adopting VBIEDs for the Armed Forces of a state entity? The answer, of course, varies depending on a nation's needs and the likelihood of finding itself engaged in regular conflict.

As the likelihood increases, in fact, the greater the usefulness of having systems of this type available. These would represent a cheap and lethal solution to be adopted as a replacement for the much more expensive and complex - as well as vulnerable - MBTs and IFVs systems. Indeed, the very last modern conflicts we have witnessed, namely the Nagorno Karabakh conflict of 2020 and the current war in Ukraine, have shown all the limitations that these massive means can have on a battlefield where technology and observation tools rule the day.

With the advent of drones and loitering munitions, there has been a continuous and unstoppable slaughter of heavy and light vehicles, without having the ability to offer definitive protection against pitfalls from the sky. Because of the high cost of production, timing, and the ease with which MBTs and IFVs are destroyed nowadays, with the consequent loss of manpower among crew members, it is rather easy to assume that remotely piloted systems are destined to become increasingly widespread and essential.

This radical change, already fully underway in air and naval warfare, is very likely to be repeated in a land warfare context as well, for obvious reasons. The use of VBIEDs, in fact, would be optimal for offensive and defensive actions, in urban and non-urban contexts, against more or less defended groupings and positions, as well as for any other warfare action already experienced in Middle Eastern lands. Moreover, their constant deployment would allow any operator to maximize the number of losses inflicted on the enemy while containing his own.

The use of VBIED, in addition, could also be of great use in antimine function, so as to exploit the blast to open gaps in minefields, thus paving the way for manned vehicles. As a highly versatile means that can be deployed in any situation, it is easy to see the benefits of putting such a system into production, adoption and use. However, the availability and deployment of these means also entails certain risks.

Being single-use vehicles and being loaded with Large quantities of explosives, transportation and their presence in high-exposure settings would pose a threat to those in the vicinity. In addition, depending on the type of explosive used there is a greater or lesser risk of accidental explosions in case of improper storage and preservation. The risks, however, are far less than the benefits of their use, especially in the case of standardized and industrially based production.

In conclusion, at the end of this brief analysis, it is very clear that VBIEDs represent a tool with great potential and with an infinite number of applications in warfare. For that reason, although the doctrine of employment may turn the noses of many, the adoption of these systems would be a great advantage for any Armed Force interested in having a high-potential, easy-to-use loitering munition system among its availabilities.

Of great interest, moreover, would be the development and putting into production of these systems by Defense operators, so that they could offer to a national, European, and international audience a modern, as well as an inexpensive and elementary, war tool capable of making a difference on a battlefield.

Andrea De Poli

Class of 1996, he graduated in 2020 with a degree in linguistic sciences from the Catholic University of the
Sacro Cuore in Milan, later perfecting his studies in Strategic Affairs at LUISS in Rome.
He previously worked for the family business group, while now serving as an analyst for Menerva. He has always devoted part of his spare time to the study of major armed, social and political conflicts of the 20th century and the present day. Over the years, he has also devoted special attention to the entire social, political and economic context of the Middle East, Ukraine and North Africa. In 2021, he published "Hezbollah: History, Organization
and doctrine of the Party of God."